

The intentionality between phenomenology and the ordinary language philosophy in “Edmund Husserl” and “John Searl” view

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Abstract:

Intentionality is the core concept in both phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy, being defined as the feature associated with the mind by directing it towards a certain object. However, phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy differ in the methodology of each theory. "Husserl" who is considered the pioneer of phenomenology, relates intentionality with consciousness; according to him it is consciousness which directs itself towards the intended or perceivable subject. Accordingly, Husserl views all conscious states as intentional, and he focused his methodology on the structure of intentionality by dividing it into: noesis and noema. He also set his own methodology for intentionality, which he named epoché or the suspension of judgment. On the other hand, "John Searl" views intentionality within the ordinary philosophy of language as a mental feature which directs mental states towards subjects in the external world or represents them. Searl indicated that the main features of intentionality are the authentic and the derived intentionality in a way that linguistic intentionality is derived from mental intentionality. In addition to that, Searl tried to find the relation between individual and collective intentionality.


Keywords: intentionality, phenomenology, ordinary language, John Searl, Edmund Husserl.

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Résumé :

Cette étude vise à explorer les similitudes et les différences entre la conception de l'intentionnalité et ses différentes formes dans la phénoménologie du philosophe Edmund Husserl et celle du philosophe du langage ordinaire John Searle. Elle emploie deux méthodologies : descriptive et comparative. Ces méthodes permettent de décrire la conception et les formes d'intentionnalité dans les œuvres des deux philosophes, et de les comparer afin d'identifier les similitudes et les différences dans leurs perspectives et leurs approches de l'intentionnalité en tant que concept philosophique issu de la raison. La recherche conclut que les deux philosophes s'accordent sur le fait que l'intentionnalité est une fonction de la raison. Cependant, Husserl l'associe fortement à la conscience, au sentiment et à d'autres facteurs, tandis que Searle tente de la catégoriser en types : intentionnalité originelle et dérivée (c'est-à-dire mentale et linguistique), ainsi qu'intentionnalité collective et individuelle.

Mot clés: phénoménologie; intentionnalité; Edmund Husserl; langage ordinaire; John Searle.

القصدية بين الفينومينولوجيا وفلسفة اللغة العادية عند ادmond هوسرل وجون سيرل

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الملخص:

تتمحور القصدية حول الفينومينولوجيا وفلسفة اللغة العادية كونها الخاصية التي ترتبط بمجال العقل بجعله متجها نحو موضوع ما، غير أنهما يختلفان في الجانب المنهجي الذي تنطلق منه كل نظرية. فـ"هوسرل" رائد الفكر الفينومينولوجي يربط القصدية بالوعي، وهو حسب الذي يتجه إلى الموضوع المقصود أو المدرك، وعليه يرى أن كل الحالات الواعية قصدية، كما ركز في منهجه على البنية القصدية مقسما إياها إلى النوتيز والنوتيميا، وقد وضع منهجا قصديا خاصا سماه الابوخية أو تعليق الحكم. أما "جون سيرل" فيرى بأن القصدية في إطار فلسفة اللغة العادية هي خاصية عقلية توجه الحالات العقلية إلى موضوعات في العالم الخارجي أو تمثيلها، وأشار بأن أبرز سمة للقصدية هي القصدية الأصلية والمستمدة، بحيث أن القصدية اللغوية تستمد من القصدية العقلية، إلى جانب هذا حاول رصد العلاقة الموجودة بين القصدية الفردية والجماعية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: القصدية؛ الفينومينولوجيا؛ اللغة العادية؛ جون سيرل؛ ادmond هوسرل.

1- Introduction: The term of intentionality has taken on purely philosophical dimensions, particularly in phenomenology and in analytic philosophy; we find that Husserl adopted this definition-intentionality- in phenomenological philosophy (phenomenology) and related it with intentional consciousness and the intended topic, John Searl also was interested in it in analytical philosophy and exactly in the Oxfordian School, he related it with different multiple aspects such as the mental , linguistic and factual aspects .

The question one must ask is: Is there any relation between the two philosophies regarding the definition of intention? Or do they share the term and differ in meaning? And is it possible to say that Searl’s meaning of intentionality is complementary to Husserl’s definition of intention.

Starting from these questions, this paper aims at dealing with some issues and discussing them in the light of what was brought by the two philosophies in their view to the meaning of intention regarding it as a topic to intentionality.

2- The intentionality in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology:

2-1--“Edmund Husserl and his intentional methodology: Researchers agree that Searl’s definition of intentionality came from his affection by his teacher “Franz Brentano” and adopted it directly from him , and he related this meaning with phenomenology and this term appeared earlier; but the first who used it as an indication to an intellectual approach was “Husserl” (Husserl, 1973, p. 43) There is no doubt that phenomenology spread posthumously ,and it was inherited by his successors, like “Martin Heidegger” , “ Merlo Ponti” and Jean Paul Sartre “ who added and modified it.

Phenomenology in its meaning is “the science of phenomena, it was used first in the field of psychology to indicate the psychological phenomena (desire, consciousness, feelings ...). Phenomenology in its philosophical aspect deals with the structure of phenomena and their general conditions which means: appearance problem and emergence (for any phenomenon), which connects at first glance with consciousness. The first convergence attracted by a certain phenomenon is the core issue that phenomenology deals with” (Zin, 2015, p. 50). So, phenomenology is related to and focuses on the definition of consciousness as it is

directed towards phenomena, and is directed to them regardless of a subjective view. This can be found exactly in Husserl's phenomenology, which founded its core definitions.

2-2- The intentionality of consciousness and its relation with phenomenology from Descartes to Husserl : Husserl started –in his project of phenomenological intentionality- from Cartesian philosophy which takes its value- according to Descartes- by going back to the subjectivity of a human being in order to establish in it knowledge; and it is the philosophy which he interpreted in his known slogan called cogito "I think , therefore I am " (Husserl, Ideas, 1982, p. 60), this expression ignored the subject to be thought about "the expression I think did not entail in it the subject of its thinking, but Descartes kept the thinking suspended without a subject...so the defect of cogito is that it does not recognize the subject as a matter of thinking...and he ended by letting the thinking subject reflect on itself" (Azzedini, 2008, p. 34), so ,Descartes ignored the subject and made everything related to the ego; even the subject itself because of just the presence of the ego included in "I think" , but

the acts of thinking and also the contents and the topics of these acts is included in this saying. (Sharfi, 2007, p. 88)

And accordingly, what leads to obliteration of or not caring about the subject is Descartes' prior dependence on the idea that doubt is the distance between the thinking ego and its subject of thinking, but Husserl replaces the distance of doubt with the definition of intentionality.

Descartes refuted the idea that consciousness goes into objects themselves, but consciousness according to "Husserl" is the characteristic which builds the intention, the phenomenological methodology according to "Husserl" – the pioneer of phenomenology as mentioned earlier – is based on the intentionality of consciousness starting from the ego to the subject.

The phenomenological methodology is based on the relation of the subject with the ego...so the essence is not separated from the subject or the phenomenon, but it establishes, stipulates and precedes it. So, in order to determine the essence, "Husserl" relies on one of the definitions which makes the phenomenological methodology called the intentionality. (Farha, 2009)

Starting from this proposition, it is clear that phenomenology complements the meaning of various phenomena and links the ego with the subject- unlike the Cartesian thinking- which means the approach that consciousness takes towards the phenomena or external objects, "it is based on a core idea that objects do not exist as objects in themselves in a previous external manner, and are completely independent of us. They always appear as objects assumed or meant by consciousness " (Farha, 2009); so that consciousness intends a certain topic, and it is always the consciousness of something and there is no subject without the ego thinking about it, therefore," the intentionality itself directs the consciousness towards the subject because it does not appear as a phenomenon in consciousness but within the intention of consciousness, and its direction to this subject is achieved through conscious actions. Therefore, most events which make our life intentional, like beliefs, hopes, fears and love... involve the direction towards something or intending it...and any action directs itself to something, so, consciousness is conscious of something and assimilation is assimilating something, and remembering is remembering something. And love is loving something and hope is hoping for something and so on. According to Husserl, any consciousness is directed towards the subject and intends it, and the ego and its intentional conscious actions are directed exactly to the subject, and Husserl confirms that by saying " The thing as an object in nature that I perceived in nature; the tree in the garden, it is it, and it is not the actual object of the intention of consciousness. (Farha, 2009)

2-3- Epoché and Husserl's suspending of judgments: Husserl set a specific definition which he named "'epoché" and it means suspending or putting judgments between brackets, which means suspending the judgments and features and previous assumptions between brackets. He" assumes putting all the existing sciences between brackets by phenomenological reduction in order to make the pure description of all that appears to consciousness possible"²¹⁴, so, he demands that all sciences should be put between brackets, and from there he "reduces" or "rejects" the existence of the phenomena and their matter in an exclusive manner to their immediate appearing in consciousness and understanding the phenomena as they are shaped by our feeling or our self-consciousness. (Sharfi, 2007, p. 94).

This suspension of the ego is what makes us stand before the pure subject itself without any belief or prejudice, and understand the phenomena as they are shaped in our consciousness, and that is what Husserl names "the transcendental ego" which differs from the individual ego in a way that it stands outside the world, and it is a predominant condition for any mental action or any experience including all the phenomenological reduction of actions, even if he alleges its transcending from its subject as a methodological measure which supports the objectivity of consciousness and what correlation should be between the ego and the subject. (Bara, 2008, p. 200)

2-4- Noesis and noema and their relation with intentional act: Husserl differentiated between two basic poles of the intentional act: "noesis" and "noema". "The noesis" is the temporary part or the temporary component of a phenomenological structure of a certain act, it is a part of the actual content of the act which gives it a specific intentional description. However, "noema", unlikely is a common general ideal structure between different acts within the same kind...This component included in noesis gives the act its direction towards a specific subject; and determines the manner in which the subject appears in the act, and it does that by giving the act meaning" (Farha, 2009). The noesis is the subjective part of the intentional act, the verb is directed towards an intentional subject; and noema is the intentional part of the act. More than that, Husserl linked the definition of intentionality with the literary text, but the question to be asked is: Did he link it with the text considering it as the target subject or did he apply this method to the literary text?

Husserl considers that the literary text- affected by philosophy of intent- is mobilized by the intention of its creator. The discourse unit agrees with the intentionality and the shapes and the parts of discourse agree with the shapes and the parts of intention.

Hence, the literary text is: "a pure embodiment of the aspects of the world and life as it appeared in the consciousness of the author and this text will fix the meaning for once and for all and this matches the mental subject held by the author in his mind or meant within writing" (Farha, 2009). According to him, the literary text is like any subject or phenomenon, it cannot be separated from the ego and it cannot be separated from the consciousness of its author. The ego of the author and

its intentional acts are the basis which builds the literary text. For this reason, Husserl did not apply his intentional method to literary texts; it was applied by another philosopher “Hirsch”

One might conclude that we indicated some phenomenological features which are:

Putting in brackets and phenomenological reduction, in addition to the definition of intentionality, all these definitions together shape “the phenomenology of Husserl”.

And the core of this methodology is the phenomenon or the subject with the ego overtaking the Cartesian thinking which separated the subject from the ego because the phenomena or the subjects intended by consciousness and this is what is known as: the intentionality of consciousness. In other words, the consciousness is directed towards an intentional subject. So, all conscious states – according to Husserl are intentional- In addition to that, he related the literary text as being directed by the intention of the author considering him as an ego identical to subject this ego.

3- The intentionality in John Searl’s linguistic philosophy and the philosophy of mind:

3-1-John Searl and his intentional methodology: John Searl – who is one of the prominent philosophers of intentional thought in philosophical studies – was interested in intentionality within the analytic philosophy. Most of his definitions focused on this idea, and he adjusted them with different aspects starting from mental intentionality to linguistic intentions which are considered as a clear vision for communication theory in discourse, and he decided on them, especially when he mentioned the correlation of intentions with meaning and speech acts.

3-2- The mental intentionality and consciousness: We mentioned earlier that Husserl linked intentionality with consciousness and the mental domain, We also find that Searl focuses on the domain of intentionality and its relation with the philosophy of mind; he considers that one of the prominent aspects of the mind is linking it with the real world because " it is that feature of mental states which correlates with or is directed towards subjects and real states outside the ego. And it is possible to direct intentionality towards an objective as well as misdirect it or fail in it because of the absence of a subject" (Searl, 2006, p. 149).

The intentionality is a mental quality, and it is either a destination which means directing the mental states towards real subjects in the world or towards a specific objective; because misleading

intentionality leads to failure in the existence of the intended subject; or it is related to subjects and real circumstances outside the ego. It can also be a representation; it represents the subjects and the state of objects in the same meaning in which speech acts represent the subjects and the circumstances of objects. So, intentionality, either in direction or attachment or in representation, it includes a lot of mental phenomena like: beliefs, hope, desire, fear, love, hatred, aversion, doubt, questioning, joy, happiness and despair, anxiety, regret, sadness, depression, and wishes. (Searl, 2006, p. 24)

And accordingly, the mind has the ability to direct its attention towards objects. All mental states are directed towards objects or refer to them. For this reason, we do not just think or just desire...but we think of something and we desire something; and this is what corresponds largely with "Edmund Husserl", who also directed all the states towards subjects or the existing objects in the world by the intentionality of consciousness.

Searl insists that it is not obligatory to follow the traditional philosophical doctrine on directing towards subjects and talk about intentionality. He considers that the term was not precise and led to confusion within the traditional doctrine itself. For this reason, he wanted to change the term according to his views with accuracy and methodology, he thought that some mental states could be intentional, and some are not. It is not possible to describe all the mental states and actions as intentional. Beliefs, fears and desires are considered intentional states, whereas reactions, happiness, and unjustified anxiety are unintentional. (Searl, 2009, p. 22)

So, Searl views that the directed mental phenomena are intentional and what is not directed is unintentional. For instance, anxiety and happiness...when they are directed becomes intentional states and when they are not directed and unjustified, they cannot be considered intentional.

Searl linked the intentionality to consciousness/feeling, but according to him not all conscious states are intentional and not all intentional states are conscious. He says, "not all consciousness is intentional and not all the intentionalities are conscious, but there is interconnectedness between consciousness and intentionality. The mental states which are in fact unconscious may become

conscious. Consciousness may not reach all these states, but it should be a kind of objects which might be a part of an unintentional mental conscious state” (Searl, 2007, p. 114).

There are conscious states that are not intentional and vice versa. There are a lot of conscious states which are unintentional such as the sudden feeling of happiness and joy, and there are many intentional states which are not conscious. I may have many beliefs that I do not think about at the moment...For instance, I believe that my ancestors spent their lives in the United States, but I did not think of this belief consciously (Searl, 2009, p. 22)

There are unintentional conscious states which are not directed, or when we do not think about something. I may have a belief in consciousness but it is unintentional, or we do not think about it. The feeling of anxiety- when not directed- the state here may be conscious but unintentional.

One of the features of the mind is the direction of fit, the mind has a direction of fit. It is said that beliefs and assumptions are true or false according to whether the is world in the way in which the belief is represented to exist. For this reason, I say that beliefs have a direction of fit from the mind to world ...but desires and intentions have no direction of fit from the mind to the world because there is no satisfaction or intention. So, it is true to say that the world is not responsible when it fails to keep up with the content of desire and harmony with intention. Beliefs, perceptions, and memories have a direction of fit from the mind to the world because their objective lies in representing the way in which objects exist; and desires and intentions have a direction of fit from the world to the mind, because their objective is not to represent the way in which objects exist but the way we want them to be or we plan for them to be. (Searl, 2009, pp. 151-153)

The distinctions conducted by John Searl in the direction of fit are important in determining the intentionality especially from the mental and the actual sides. The distinction of the direction of fit may be from the word to the world, from the word to the world, from the mind to the world or from the world to the mind.

3-3- Intrinsic intentionality and derived intentionality: One of the distinctive features of intentionality is being mental. In other words, the mental states are directed towards subjects or relate to them in the outside world.

Intentionality is mental, but we may ask: is it possible that intentionality could be linguistic?

The complex problematique is whether an intention could be mental without language or vice versa, and do we derive the mental intention from the linguistic one? Or do we derive the linguistic intention from the mental one? " We cannot explain the intentionality of the mind in terms of the intentionality of language, because the intentionality of language is derived from the intentionality of the mind " (Searl, 2006, p. 136)

Thus, we see that signs and words referring to an object in the past are not represented by linguistic signs, or by the words written on paper; but it is the mind that imposes an intentionality on them.

Searl clarifies precisely the distinction between the two intentionalities. The intrinsic intentionality and the derived intentionality. He says : " The distinction between the intrinsic intentionality and the derived intentionality is a more special state of a much more fundamental distinction: between observer-independent features of the world such as :force, mass, ... and observer-dependent features such as the existence of a chair, or a sentence in English " (Searl, 2006, p. 141) ; The intrinsic intentionality does not rely on the observer, like: beliefs and so on because it is a set of mental representations subject to our egos regardless of what an observer thinks about them. However, the derived intentionality relies on the observer as a whole; it means self-meaning. The intrinsic intentionality has an unobserved mind and the derived intentionality has no mind; it relies on the observer. And accordingly, the intentionality of language must be explained according to the intentionality of the mind and not the opposite.

This does not mean that there are not no non-linguistic intentions. There are linguistic intentions, he says:" I observed that children and animals that have no language and do not perform speech acts, in fact they have intentional states "(Searl, 2009, p. 26): It is not possible to explain children and animal's behavior away from intentionality, despite lacking language. However, he explained linguistic intentionality according to the indication of words and meanings is considered as two that definitions that rely on language.

Are the intentionality of words and the intentionality of meaning just related linguistically? Or is there an interference of mental intention in explaining the meaning? Logically, since the meaning and the word are derived from language, and language is derived from the mind, they both have a direct relation to the mind," The semantic intentionality is contrary to the semantic of words, it is a specific feature of sentences and linguistic issues" (Searl, 2007, p. 142).

Verbal intentionality is specific to the linguistic meaning of sentences and expressions. These meanings are derived from language expressions. Concerning the meaning, it relates to the mental intention. The intended meaning by the speaker is in the light of intentional aspects and not in linguistic ones. So, if we can determine the meaning in the light of intentions, hence, we are defining a linguistic meaning in the light of a non-linguistic meaning. (Searl, 2009, p. 204)

3-4-individual and collective intentionality: Is there a relation between individual intentionality and collective intentionality? Or is there just an individual intentionality which can be adopted in all intentional cases? Or is there a collective intentionality which contributes to determining the intentional cases whether they are mental or linguistic ones?

Searl says: " We discussed intentionality as a formula such as: I mean or I think...and so on, but there is another form of intentionality formulated as: we mean or we think" (2006, p. 174). Searl views that there are two kinds of intentionality, individual intentionality, which is the intentionality of "the ego", and collective intentionality which is "we", Searl explains that: " A lot of animal species and human beings have the ability to have mental intention and to direct themselves collectively towards objects and express it, more than that, they share states of mental intentions such as beliefs, desires and intentions. There is a collective mental intention in addition to the individual mental intention" (Searl, 2012, p. 55)

So, there is a collective intention shared by persons in some states existing in the world. At the same time, he mentions the possibility of relating collective intentionality to individual intentionality. He says: "We imagine that collective intentionality can be related to individual intentionality, and we imagine that the intentionality of "we" must always be rejected in the way that it is excluded in favor of the intentionality of "The ego" (Searl, 2006, p. 175). And accordingly, the intentionality of a

group is reduced to the intentionality of an individual "and they assume that where two persons share a collective intention, like when they try to do something together, both have an intention with the formula: "I intend" (Searl, 2006, p. 175), and usually they share common beliefs. If we intend to do something together, it means I intend to do it, and everyone within the group thinks the same way as the other members. The individual intentionality is not compelling, and it is not possible to consider that all the intentionalities are formulated with "I intend "and individuals may have intentionality formulated with "we intend". Searl says: "It is not required to express all the intentionality with the first-person pronoun; there is nothing to prevent us from having an intention with the formula "we intend" in our own minds" (2006, p. 177)

And the key factor in collective intention is the feeling of doing something together such as the desire for something, or thinking about it...). However, we find that the intention of individual consciousness- which each one of us has -is derived from the intention of collective consciousness shared by individuals" (Searl, 2012, p. 56). For instance, playing football or performing a piece of music...these explained by collective intentionality. For example, in football, each player has an individual intention, the goalkeeper intends to save goals, and the defenders defend the goal and every player has his own individual intention. The attackers also have an intention of scoring goals. All these individual intentions are in favor of a collective intention for a team to win a game. The collective intentionality according to "Searl" is linked to social facts. In other words, any social activity which includes two actors or more having a collective intentionality. This also applies to animals which hunt together, birds which build their nests, two persons playing sports together or facts related to humanitarian organizations, they talk to each other and they possess things. (Searl, 2012, p. 58)

According to this view, there is not only an individual intentionality or the intentionality of the ego, but there is also a collective intentionality "we". This latter may involve two or more individuals acting in favor of a certain intention, and it is seen clearly in social facts. As for the individual intentionality is in individual states like: I think, I wish ...

4- Conclusion: Based on what was discussed, we conclude that “Husserl” and “Searl” disagree a lot and agree to a lesser extent in their views on the meaning of intentionality. Because, Searl overcame the Husserlian thought which limited intentionality to one domain; which is the link of intentionality with the mental domain and precisely the intention of consciousness, and he considered conscious states as intentional, and he left no room for any interpretation.

In other words, he linked each phenomenon with its specific subject, especially the literary text. On the other hand, Searl was interested in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, he saw mental intentionality as the core and the basis for the linguistic intentionality; because the understanding of meaning and speech acts which are classified within the linguistic field, but they are derived from the mental intention. And the points of convergence between the two philosophers lie in the relation of the mental intentionality with consciousness, and despite that Searl disagrees with Husserl on some ideas. According to Searl, not all mental states are intentional and not all conscious states are intentional.

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